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Defendant/appellee

Eugene Horbach

("Horbach") respectfully

submits this brief in response to the Brief of plaintiff/appellant
Lan C. England ("England").
JURISDICTION
On November 14, 1994 the Utah Supreme Court transferred this
matter

to the Utah Court

of Appeals, which

has

jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
None of the arguments upon which England attempts to base his
appeal were raised before the trial court.
to the issues identified

Therefore, in addition

in England's Brief, this appeal also

presents the issue of whether the Court of Appeals may reverse the
trial court based upon arguments raised

for the first time on

appeal.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES ORDINANCES, AND RULES
During trial, the trial court granted Horbach*s motion to
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.

That amendment,

which England challenges in section VI. of his Brief, is governed
not by Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but by Rule
15(b), pursuant to which a trial court must allow amendment of the
x

Rule 15(b) reads as follows:
Amendments to conform to evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues.
If
30707

pleadings to include issues tried by the express or implied consent
of the parties.

(See discussion at pp. 19-21 below.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 23, 1991 England told Horbach that Horbach still owed
$25,000 under a stock purchase agreement the parties had made in
late 1989.

This was incorrect.

In the stock purchase agreement

Horbach had agreed to purchase certain stock

from England

for

$710,498.25, and by May 23, 1991 Horbach had already made payments
totalling $855,000. Therefore, rather than owing $25,000, Horbach
had overpaid by $144,501.75.

However, because neither party had

kept track of Horbach's payments, England mistakenly stated, and
Horbach mistakenly believed, that $25,000 remained owing.
Based on this mistake, Horbach agreed to give England an
additional $25,000 and an interest in 2% of the stock,2 and England
conveyed

the

stock

to

Horbach.

Horbach

paid

the

additional

evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that
it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b)(1994).
The parties disputed the exact nature of this interest.
England claimed that Horbach agreed to convey the 2% of the stock
to England outright. By contrast, Horbach claimed he had merely
granted a security interest in the 2% of the stock to secure
payment of the additional $25,000 which he mistakenly believed he
owed.
This dispute regarding precisely what Horbach agreed to
convey is, however, mooted by the trial court's holding that the
agreement is unenforceable because it was based on a mutual mistake
and was unsupported by consideration.
30707

2

$25,000—making his total payment $880,000 and his over-payment
$169,501.75.

However, England initiated the action below in an

attempt to force Horbach to also convey the 2% of the stock.
At trial, England introduced into evidence Horbach's $880,000
of payments, and conceded that as of May 23, 1991 Horbach had
already paid the entire contractual
$710,498.25.

stock purchase price of

Therefore, the trial court held that England was

merely fulfilling a pre-existing contractual duty when he conveyed
the stock to Horbach on May 23, 1991, and that no new consideration
supported Horbach's agreement to give England another $25,000 or
any interest in 2% of the stock. The trial court further held that
the May 23, 1991 agreement was based on the parties' mutual mistake
regarding the amount Horbach had paid. On these two bases--lack of
consideration, and mutual

mistake--the

trial

court held

the

agreement unenforceable, denied England's claim for the 2% of the
stock, and granted Horbachfs counterclaim to recoup his $169,501.75
overpayment.
RELEVANT FACTS
The May 23rd Agreement
In late 1989 England and Horbach entered into a stock purchase
agreement whereby Horbach agreed to purchase from England 258,363
shares of stock in Medicode, Inc. for $710,498.25.

(Record (,fR.M)

256, 488, 5313, 572). Beginning on December 29, 1989, Horbach made
numerous payments to England, but failed to keep an accurate
3

Page 531 of the Record should be page 85 of the Trial
Transcript. That page is missing from the official copy of the
Record, and is therefore attached hereto as Exhibit A.
30707
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account of those payments.
Horbach

had

mistakenly

(R. 256, 576). By September 14, 1990

paid

a

total

of

$855,000, which

was

$144,501.75 more than the contractual stock purchase price.

(R.

256, 257, 539-540).
On

May

purchase.

23,

1991

the

parties

met

to

finalize

the

stock

(R. 257, 505). England conceded at trial that as of May

23, 1991 Horbach had already overpaid the agreed stock purchase
price.

(R. 539-540).

However, England had also failed to keep an

accurate account of the payments he had received; he testified at
trial that on May 23, 1991 he believed he was still owed between
$25,000 and $75,000.

(R. 517).

England further testified that

during the May 23, 1991 meeting he told Horbach that an additional
$25,000 was owed.

(R. 517-518).

At the May 23, 1991 meeting, Horbach mistakenly

believed

England's statement that he still owed $25,000 of the $710,498.25
purchase price specified in the 1989 stock purchase agreement.

(R.

257, 577). Based on this mistake, Horbach agreed to pay England an
additional $25,000 and to give England an interest in 2% of the
Medicode

stock, and

England

agreed

to

immediately

Medicode stock to Horbach (the "May 23rd Agreement").

convey

his

(R. 257-258,

506, 518, 577).
Horbach subsequently paid England the additional $25,000. (R.
258,

5124) .

England

to

This

payment

$880,000, which

brought
was

4

Horbach's

$169,501.75

total
in

payment

excess

of

to
the

Page 512 of the Record should be page 66 of the Trial
Transcript. That page is missing from the official copy of the
Record, and is therefore attached hereto as Exhibit B.
30707
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$710,498.25 contractual purchase price.

(R. 258). Nevertheless,

England demanded that Horbach also reconvey 2% of the Medicode
stock.

(R. 512). Horbach refused, and England filed his complaint

initiating the action below on March 15, 1993.

(R. 2-18).

Horbach's Discovery Of His Overpayment Of England
On December 14, 1993, Horbach informed the trial court that he
had recently discovered evidence regarding his overpayment of
England.

Horbach moved the trial court for leave to amend his

answer to include a counterclaim to recoup this overpayment.5
Horbach also moved the trial court to continue the trial date and
to allow further discovery into this overpayment issue.6
England resisted the motion for a continuance, representing
that he "is presently prepared
matter."7
a

to proceed to trial on this

England also opposed England's motion for leave to file

counterclaim

on two grounds:

(1) that

"at the pretrial

settlement conference, Horbach was authorized to file a Motion for
Continuance but not a Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim," and
(2) that "untimely motions to file counterclaims must be denied."8
The trial court denied Horbach's motion on December 20, 1993. (R.
199-200).

Nevertheless, on February

4, 1994 England

served

5

Motion For: Continuance Of Trial, Leave To File Counterclaim,
And To Extend Discovery Period. (R. 184-189).
6

id.

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Horbach's Motion for
Continuance of Trial, Leave to File a Counterclaim, and to Extend
Discovery Period at 2. (R. 193-198).
8

Id. at 4.
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interrogatories on Horbach asking him to explain the basis of his
proposed counterclaim that he had overpaid England.

(R. 206-207;

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents to Defendant Eugene Horbach at 6 (attached hereto as
Exhibit C) ) .
The Trial Below
This matter was tried to the court below on March 22, 1994.
In

Horbachfs

Trial

Memorandum,

hand-delivered

to

England

the

morning of trial, Horbach argued that the pleadings should be
amended

to

include

overpayment.
addressed

the

a

counterclaim

(R. 228-230).
overpayment

for

recoupment

of

his

Horbach's counsel then explicitly
issue

in

his

opening

statement

as

follows:
When we're through here, we're going to be seeking to ask
the Court to modify the pleadings to conform to the
evidence. We think that Mr. Horbach is due back about
$350,000 that he's overpaid Mr. England, but that will
come out when you see the evidence as it comes in.
(R. 452-453).

Furthermore, at the close of England's case in

chief, Horbach's counsel moved for a directed verdict and stated
that "the only issue left is what is the amount of the overpayment
in terms of our ability to get it back from them."

(R.565).

At trial, England never opposed amending the pleadings; nor
did he suggest that he was unprepared for, or would in any way be
prejudiced
England's

by, the trial
counsel

of

Horbach's

acknowledged

in

his

counterclaim.
opening

Rather,

statement

that

"there's been a recent defense raised that Mr. England was way
overpaid for the stock in the amount of about $200,000."

30707
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(R. 450).

England's counsel and stated that in order to respond to the issue
of overpayment,
we will have to complicate the case a little bit and have
Mr. England give background on that issue and he will do
that in his testimony.
(R. 450 (emphasis added)).
all

of Horbach's

$169,501.75
objected

to

$880,000

overpayment.
the

overpayment.

England then himself put into evidence
in payments
(R.

introduction

which demonstrated

241, 539-540).
of

evidence

England

regarding

the

never

Horbach's

Nor did he propose that his own evidence regarding

Horbach's $880,000 in payments should be admitted only on the
limited issue of whether Horbach had made payment in full, rather
than the additional issue of whether Horbach had overpaid.
At the close of evidence, Horbach's counsel formally moved to
conform the pleadings to the evidence which had been adduced.
598).

(R.

The trial court noted that he had taken note of Horbach's

request in his Trial Memorandum to amend the pleadings to add a
counterclaim for recoupment of the overpayment.

(id.).

England

again failed to oppose Horbach's motion, or to make any objection
to the requested amendment.
The trial court found that as of May 23, 1991, Horbach had
overpaid

England

by

$144,501.75,

but

that

the

parties

both

mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained owing, and entered into
the May 23rd Agreement on the basis of that mutual mistake.
257-258).

(R.

The trial court further found that Horbach subsequently

paid England an additional $25,000, bringing his total overpayment
to 169,501.75.

30707

(R. 258).
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Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that
"[a]s

of

May

23,

1991,

[Horbach]

had

fully

performed

his

obligations under the 1989 stock purchase agreement," and that
England therefore "was legally obligated to convey his 258,363
shares of Medicode to" Horbach.

(R. 258-259).

The trial court

concluded that when England agreed to immediately convey his stock
to Horbach he was merely agreeing to perform "a preexisting duty,"
and that this did not provide any consideration to support the May
23rd Agreement.

(R. 259). The trial court also concluded that the

May 23rd Agreement was unenforceable as a result of the parties1
mutual mistake.

(I^d. ) • Finally, the trial court granted Horbach' s

motion to amend the pleadings, and awarded Horbach judgment on his
counterclaim for the amount of his overpayment.

(R. 259-260, 442).

At trial, England testified that he had made an agreement to
perform certain services for Horbach, and that part of Horbach's
payments

to him were

for those

purchase

of the Medicode

stock.

services

rather

(R. 257).

than

for

The trial

the

court

rejected England's testimony, holding that it was "not credible" on
this point.

(Id.).

England also testified that it had been his

"understanding" that the purchase price for the Medicode stock "was
to be paid in two or three months."
9

The trial court also rejected

England testified as follows:
Q.
What did Mr. Horbach say he was going to do in
connection with the stock sale?
A.
He said that he would be purchasing my stock at
$2.75 per share.
Q.
And what did you say?
A.
I agreed that that sounded fine and requested
that it be done in short order and I expected that to be
the first quarter.
30707
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this testimony, holding that although Horbach did not complete
payment of the purchase price within two or three months, ,f[a]s of
May 23, 1991, [Horbach] had fully performed his obligations under
(R. 258-259).10

the 1989 stock purchase agreement."

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In sections I and II of his Brief, England attacks the trial
court's holding that the May 23rd Agreement was unsupported by
consideration.
duty

to

convey

England argues that although he had a preexisting
the

stock

to Horbach, he

sincerely

(albeit

mistakenly) believed that he did not, and that therefore his
agreement to convey the stock constituted consideration.
argument fails for several reasons:
court's

alternative

holding

that

This

(1) It ignores the trial

the May

23rd Agreement

unenforceable on the basis of mutual mistake;

is

(2) England's

consideration argument is raised for the first time on appeal; and

Q.
Were
payment would
statements?
•

any statements made about when that
be made, and if so, who made the

• •

A.
I'm having trouble answering this because I'm
just trying to give a straightforward answer. It was my
recollection and it is my understanding that it was to be
paid in two or three months. I don't know how else to
answer that.
(R. 490-491).
1

England characterizes his own testimony on this point as
"undisputed." (E.g., England's Brief at 10-11). However, as the
Utah Supreme Court has held, "[t]he testimony of a party or other
interested witness is not conclusive, even if it is not
contradicted." Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 P.2d
101, 104 (Utah 1978).
30707
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(3) surrender of an utterly baseless claim, even if sincerely
believed, does not constitute consideration.
In section III of his Brief, England argues that even if the
May 23, 1991 agreement is unsupported by consideration, it may be
enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
fails for the following reasons:

This argument

(1) It too is raised for the

first time on appeal; (2) England's performance of a preexisting
contractual duty does not constitute detrimental reliance; and (3)
Horbach's mistake regarding his payments to England precludes him
from being promissorily estopped.
Finally, in section IV of his Brief, England asserts that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting Horbach's motion to
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence adduced at trial.
England's argument fails for the following reasons:

(1) England

failed to assert any of the bases of this argument before the trial
court; and

(2) the overpayment

issue was tried with England's

implied assent, and the trial court therefore had no discretion in
allowing an amendment.
ARGUMENT
When the decision of a trial court is reviewed on appeal, the
Utah Court of Appeals will "presume [the decision] to be correct
and search for grounds upon which [it] may be upheld."

Allen v.

Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah
1992).

Therefore, the Court of Appeals will affirm

"a trial

court's decision whenever [it] can do so on a proper ground, even
though it was not the ground on which the trial court relied in its
30707
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ruling."

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677

P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984).

By contrast, the Court of Appeals

will not reverse a trial court based upon "an issue raised for the
first time on appeal." Wurst v. Department of Employment S e c , 818
P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991); see also John Deere Co. v. A & H
Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1994) (appellant who
"did not properly raise [an] issue at the trial court below" is
"precluded from arguing it on appeal").
England asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the trial
court on the basis of three legal arguments.

However, England

failed to raise any of those arguments before the trial court.
Moreover, England's arguments are all legally untenable. The trial
court's judgment must therefore be affirmed.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE MAY 23rd AGREEMENT IS
UNENFORCEABLE
The trial court gave two alternative bases for its holding

that the May 23rd Agreement is unenforceable.

First, because

Horbach had already "fully performed his obligations under the 1989
stock purchase agreement" England was "legally obligated to convey
his 258,363 shares of Medicode stock to" Horbach, and England's
performance

of

such

a

"preexisting

consideration for a valid contract."

duty

does

(R. 258-259).

not

provide

Second, the

May 23rd Agreement was unenforceable because it was executed under
the parties' mutually mistaken belief that $25,000 remained owing
under the original stock purchase agreement.

(R. 257, 259).

England challenges the first basis of the trial court's
judgment—lack of consideration—in sections I and II of his Brief.
30707
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However, he simply ignores the second basis of the judgment--mutual
mistake.

The trial court must therefore be affirmed regardless of

whether England's consideration argument might have any merit.
Moreover,

as

discussed

below,

England's

argument

is

legally

fallacious.
A.
As

The Judgment Of The Trial Court Must Be Sustained On The
Ground Of The Parties' Mutual Mistake.
noted

above, the

trial

court's

holding

regarding

the

parties' mutual mistake provides an independently sufficient basis
for the conclusion that the May 23rd Agreement is unenforceable.
Nevertheless, England challenges neither the factual determination
that the May 2 3rd Agreement was entered into on the basis of a
mutual mistake,11 nor the legal proposition that such a mistake
renders the agreement unenforceable. See Neiderhauser Builders and
Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d

1193, 1198

(Utah App.

1992)

(purported accord and satisfaction unenforceable if it was executed
under a unilateral or mutual mistake).

The judgment of the trial

court must therefore be affirmed on the ground of mutual mistake,
regardless of England's argument regarding consideration.
B.

England Demonstrates No Error In The Trial Court's
Judgment That The May 23rd Agreement Is Unsupported By
Consideration.

Although England

purports

to challenge

the trial

court's

judgment that no consideration supported the May 23rd Agreement, he
does not dispute the premises of that judgment—that Horbach had
already performed all of his contractual duties, and that England
xl

The evidence introduced at trial not only supports the trial
court's finding, but is undisputed on this point. (R. 532).
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therefore had a preexisting duty to convey the stock.
259).x

(R. 258-

England thus concedes, as he must, that on May 23, 1991

he had no legitimate basis for refusing to convey the stock to
Horbach.
Nevertheless, England bases his appeal upon a new legal
proposition: that consideration "may consist of a compromise of a
bona fide

dispute which is not necessarily well-founded but is in

good faith." (England's Brief at 12 (quoting In re Grimm, 784 P. 2d
1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989)).

England attempts to bring himself

within this proposition by asserting that he believed that he was
entitled to withhold the stock, and although this belief was
mistaken, it was nonetheless "bona fide."

(England's Brief at 11).

This argument fails for a number of reasons discussed below.
1.

England may not seek to have the trial court
reversed with a consideration argument raised for
the first time on appeal.

England's present argument—that his sincere but mistaken
belief that he was not legally obligated to convey the stock to
Horbach makes his agreement to do so sufficient consideration to
support the May 23rd Agreement--was never raised before the trial
court. The judgment of the trial court may not be reversed on the

England conceded at trial that by May 23, 1991 Horbach had
already paid him more than the contractual stock purchase price,
(R. 539-540), and he does not dispute this fact on appeal.
(England's Brief at 12 n.3). Moreover, although he claims to have
believed "that he had no obligation to turn the stock over to"
Horbach, he concedes that this "belief was wrong."
(England's
Brief at 11).
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basis of such an argument raised for the first time on appeal.
Wurst, 818 P.2d at 1039; John Deere, 876 P.2d at 888.13
2.

There was no "dispute" at the May 23rd meeting,
only a mutual mistake.

Furthermore, the proposition on which England attempts to
rely--that the "compromise of a bona

fide

dispute" may provide

consideration—is simply inapposite to the facts of this case as
proven at trial. No evidence of any "dispute" was ever introduced.
Rather,

England

remained

owing,

representation.
bona

fide

testified
and

that

Horbach

he

told

testified

Horbach
that

he

that

$25,000

believed

this

(R. 517-518, 577). Here there was no "dispute,"

or otherwise, and England's consideration argument is

therefore inapplicable.

Instead, there was only a mutual mistake,

and as discussed above, this provides an independent basis for the
trial

court's

holding

that

the

May

23rd

Agreement

was

unenforceable.
3.

The compromise of a wholly baseless position cannot
constitute consideration.

Finally, the proposition upon which England attempts to r e l y that

the

"compromise

necessarily

of

a

well-founded"

bona

fide

dispute

constitutes

which

is

not

consideration--is

inapplicable to the "compromise" of a position as utterly baseless
as was England's.

By May 23, 1991, Horbach had already paid

England $855,000, which was $144,501.75 more than the $710,498.25
13

Because this argument was not raised below, the purported
sincerity of England's belief was never a material issue at trial,
and therefore, was never challenged. This highlights the policy
reasons for requiring a party such as England to raise all such
arguments before the trial court.
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purchase price.
that

he was

(R. 257). Therefore, England's supposed "belief1

still

owed

$25,000 was

completely

baseless, and

depended upon his continuing failure to simply add up the payments
he had received from Horbach.
None of the cases which England cites found an enforceable
accord and satisfaction where such a meritless position had been
compromised.

Rather, in In re Grimm, 784 P. 2d 1238 (Utah App.

1989), this Court enforced an accord and satisfaction because it
was supported by the compromise of "a legitimate controversy as to
what assets" were subject to a trust.

784 P.2d at 1244. Likewise,

in Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985), an
accord and satisfaction was enforced because it was supported by
the

compromise

of an

apparently

meritorious

quality of the performance of a contract.

dispute

over

the

699 P.2d at 731, 733.14

Four of the other cases cited by England actually undercut
his position. Thus, in Ashton v. Skeen, 39 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah
1935), the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce a purported accord
and satisfaction because no valid position had been compromised;
the court did not address whether or not the appellant had a good
faith belief in that position.
In Neiderhauser Builders v.
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah App. 1992), this Court held
that "[w]hen there is a unilateral mistake, and a party accepts
less than it is entitled to, the theory of accord and satisfaction
will not prevent the mistaken party's recovery of the actual,
correct amount."
Suqarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d
1369, 1372 (Utah 1980), holds that where "the underlying claim is
liquidated and certain as to amount, separate consideration must be
found to support the accord; otherwise, the obligor binds himself
to do nothing he was not already obligated to do, and the obligee's
promise to accept a substitute performance is unenforceable." In
Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 P.2d 267, 270 (Kan.
App. 1982), the Kansas court held that M [ a ] n Y forbearance to
prosecute or defend a claim or action . . . is usually a sufficient
consideration for a contract based thereon, unless the claim or
defense is obviously invalid, worthless or frivolous." (Emphasis
added).
The remainder of England's cases are simply inapposite.
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Therefore, these cases stand only for the proposition that a
claim

need

not

necessarily

be

a

"winner"

in

order

for

the

compromise of that claim to provide consideration supporting an
accord and satisfaction.

They do not support England's argument

that consideration can be found in the "compromise" of a completely
baseless claim.

Rather, as noted in 15A C.J.S. § 11(d) (1967) at

211,
A mere belief on the part of a claimant that he has a
claim, without any facts on which such belief may be
founded, is not sufficient. . . . Good faith alone . . .
has been held insufficient to support a compromise where
the claim surrendered is wholly without foundation and
not a doubtful one.
Therefore, even if England had raised this argument before the
trial court, and even if there had been a "dispute" capable of
being compromised, his purported belief that he was still owed
$25,000 was not merely not "well-founded," but was utterly devoid
of foundation.

England's "compromise" of this belief provides no

consideration to support any accord and satisfaction.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court that the
May 23rd Agreement is unenforceable must be affirmed.
II.

THIS COURT MAY NOT REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE
MAY 23RD AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE ON THE BASIS OF ENGLAND'S
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT
In section III of his Brief, England argues that even if the

May 23rd Agreement

is unsupported

by consideration, it should

nevertheless be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
This argument fails for several reasons discussed below.
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A.

England May Not Seek To Have The Trial Court Reversed
With A Promissory Estoppel Argument Raised For The First
Time On Appeal.

England's promissory estoppel argument was never raised before
the trial court, but is asserted for the first time on this appeal.
Therefore, he may not ask this Court to reverse the judgment of the
trial court on the basis of that argument.

Wurst, 818 P.2d at

1039; John Deere, 876 P.2d at 888.
B.

England Cannot Demonstrate Any Detrimental Reliance.

England concedes that detrimental reliance is an essential
element of promissory estoppel, but argues that this element is
satisfied by his agreement to convey the stock to Horbach on May
23, 1991. (England's Brief at 15-16). However, as the trial court
concluded, England had a preexisting legal duty to convey the stock
to Horbach.

(R. 258-259).

As a matter of law, the performance of

such a preexisting duty cannot constitute detrimental reliance for
the sake of a promissory estoppel claim.

80 Nassau Associates v.

Crossland Federal Savings Bank, 169 B.R. 832, 842 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994) ('fA party cannot assert estoppel, however, as a result of
being 'induced1 to do what he is already legally required to do.");
In re Marriage of Neiss, 743 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Mont. 1987) (denying
promissory estoppel claim where party has not done substantially
more than he was already legally obligated to do) . Therefore, even
if England's promissory estoppel theory were properly before this
Court, the judgment of the trial court could not be reversed on
that theory.
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C.

Horbach's Mistaken Belief That He Still Owed England
$25/000 Precludes Promissory Estoppel.

Finally, the case on which England relies for the essential
elements of promissory estoppel, Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993), provides that one of
factual

prerequisites

for

promissory

estoppel"

defendants were aware of all the material facts."

is

M

[t]he

"that

the

848 P.2d at 175

(quoting Tolboe Constr. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d
843, 845 (Utah 1984)).

As the trial court found, on May 23, 1991

Horbach mistakenly believed that he still owed England $25,000,
when in fact he had already overpaid by $144,501.75.

(R. 257).

Therefore, Horbach was clearly not "aware of all the material
facts," and promissory estoppel is inapplicable.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HORBACH'S MOTION TO AMEND THE
PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL
A.

England Made No Objection To Horbach's Rule 15(b) Motion
Before The Trial Court, And May Not Do So For The First
Time On Appeal.

In his Trial Memorandum, Horbach argued that he was entitled
to restitution of his overpayment, and that the pleadings should be
amended to include such a counterclaim.

(R. 228-230).

In his

opening statement, Horbach's counsel stated that he intended to
prove that England had been overpaid, and that he would ask the
trial court to amend the pleadings to include Horbach's claim for
the restitution of this overpayment.

(R. 452-453).

Then, in his

motion for a directed verdict at the close of England's case,
Horbach's counsel stated that "the only issue left is what is the
amount of the overpayment in terms of our ability to get it back
30707
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from them."
Horbach's

(R. 565).

Finally, after the close of evidence,

counsel made a

conformed to the evidence.

formal motion to have the pleadings
(R. 598).

The trial court granted

Horbach's motion, and gave him judgment on his counterclaim against
England.
In section IV. of his Brief, England argues that the trial
court abused its discretion when it granted Horbach's motion to
amend.

However, at no time during trial did England suggest any

opposition to Horbach's motion to amend.

Rather, all of England's

arguments that granting the motion was unfairly prejudicial are
raised for the first time on this appeal.

Having failed to

oppose England's motion to amend before the trial court, England
may not raise this issue on appeal.

Wurst, 818 P.2d at 1039; John

Deere, 876 P.2d at 888.
B.

Because The Overpayment Issue Was Tried By Consent It
Would Have Been Error For The Trial Court Not To Grant
Horbach's Motion For Leave To Amend.

Not only did England fail to object to Horbach's motion to
amend, but he also made no objection to the presentation of the

15

0n December 14, 1993, Horbach had made a motion pursuant to
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to add a
counterclaim for restitution of the overpayment.
(R. 184-189).
England opposed that motion on procedural grounds; he did not raise
any of the arguments regarding prejudice which now appear in his
Brief. (R. 193-198).
Although the trial court denied Horbach's Rule 15(a) motion,
"a court's refusal to permit an amendment before trial under Rule
15(a) will not prevent the same amendment from being made under
Rule 15(b) if the issue subsequently is tried with the consent of
the parties." 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary K.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493 (1990) at 51.
Horbach's motion to amend at trial was governed by Rule 15(b), and
as discussed in the text above, was wholly unopposed by England.
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overpayment issue at trial.

As discussed above, Horbach clearly

announced his intention to try the overpayment issue. Rather than
object that he was unprepared for or would be prejudiced by the
trial of this issue, England's counsel acknowledged that the issue
had been raised and stated that he would respond to it.

(R. 450).

Then England himself introduced all of the evidence demonstrating
that he had been overpaid by $169,501.75. England never suggested
that this evidence should be admitted only as relevant to whether
Horbach had paid in full, as opposed to whether Horbach had
overpaid.
Because England never objected to trial of the overpayment
issue, and because he himself introduced the evidence supporting
Horbach's overpayment counterclaim, England implicitly consented to
the trial of this issue.

General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero

Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976) ("Implied consent may
be found where one party raises an issue material to the other
party's case, or where evidence is introduced without objection.11) .
Where as here an issue is tried "by the express or implied consent
of the parties," Rule 15(b) makes it "mandatory for the trial court
to grant leave to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence."
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktq., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 509
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(Utah App. 1988).16

Thus, it would have been reversible error for

the trial court to have denied Horbach's motion to amend.17
On pages 20 through 22 of his Brief, England attempts to
excuse his failure to object by arguing that he remained unaware
throughout the trial that Horbach intended to counterclaim for
restitution of the overpayment.

This argument is ludicrous.

As

discussed above, Horbach repeatedly and explicitly announced his
intention to try the overpayment issue and to counterclaim for the
recoupment of that overpayment. England therefore cannot possibly
have remained ignorant that Horbach intended to counterclaim, and
that the overpayment issue was being tried. By failing to object,
England implicitly consented to the trial of this issue, and his
attempt to challenge the trial court's grant of Horbach's motion to
18

amend is legally and factually baseless.
16

5ee also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227, 1229
(Utah 1984) (where issue not raised in the pleadings had been tried
with the parties' implicit consent, "Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) dictates
that the issue should be treated as if it had been raised in the
pleadings"); Carnicero, 545 P.2d at 506 ("[T]he first part of Rule
15(b) is not permissive in terms, for it provides that issues tried
by express or implied consent shall be treated as if raised in the
pleadings.").
17

Because the granting of a motion to amend under the first
part of Rule 15(b) is not discretionary, England's argument must be
rejected without ever reaching the abuse of discretion issue.
However, even assuming this issue were presented, on the facts of
this case there cannot possibly have been an abuse of discretion:
England had opposed further discovery regarding the overpayment
issue (R. 193-198), represented to the trial court that he was
ready to try this issue (R. 194, 450), and then himself introduced
the evidence showing overpayment.
18

England cites a number of cases as purported support for his
attack on the trial court's grant of leave to amend. However, all
of those merely upheld trial courts' exercise of discretion in
denying motions to amend. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, England's appeal must be
denied, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
DATED this 21st day of February, 1995
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON
Stephen G. Crockett
Steven E. McCowin
Wesley D. Felix
First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MURPHY, TOLBOE
Steven L.
124 South
Salt Lake

& MABEY
Taylor
600 East, #100
City, Utah 84102

By:
Attorneys for DefendarTt/Appellee

(Utah App. 1988) ("we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Chadwick's motion to amend her complaint");
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) ("the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the
complaint"); Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988, 989-90
(Utah 1982) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellant's motion to amend."); Trafton v. Younqblood, 442
P.2d 648, 658 (Cal. 1968) ("the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting the amendment"). England fails to cite any
case in which a trial court was held to have abused its discretion
by granting such a motion.
On page 21 of his Brief, England represents that Trafton is
"strikingly similar" to the instant case. However, as noted above,
Trafton merely affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to
amend. Moreover, the motion to amend in Trafton was not made at
trial, but only after the filing of the trial court's memorandum of
decision.
442 P. 2d at 657. Further, the amendment would have
added an issue which "by the explicit agreement of the parties, was
not before the court," and which the moving party had "renounced."
442 P.2d at 658.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE were hand-delivered this 21st day of February, 1995 to the
following:
Samuel D. McVey
Randy T. Austin
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

LAN C. ENGLAND,
Plaintiff,
TRIAL
vs.
Civil No. CIV 930901471 CV
EUGENE HORBACH, MEDICODE
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
on Tuesday, March 22, 1994

For the Plaintiff:

SAMUEL D. McVEY
RANDY AUSTIN
60 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
328-3600

For the Defendant
Horbach:

STEPHEN G. CROCKETT
WES FELIX
136 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah
533-8383

84101

STEVEN L. TAYLOR
311 South State, #450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
521-8900

ANNA

M. BENNETT, C.S.R.

License No. 220
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 535-5203

Mr. Horbach, would you have any argument that it's different,
or would you contend it's different than the 809,599.35?
A

No, that would be correct.

Q

Okay.

Now, I'm going to assume for a second for

purpose of the question, I want to do the stock shares in
evidence and it's 258,363, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

The 2.75 a share, that was the agreed price?

A

Correct.

Q

So that equals $710,498.25?

A

Correct.

Q

And that's what you had coming for those shares of

stock, isn't it?

That's what you agreed to sell them for in

any event?
A

Yes, in the initial agreement.

Q

Okay.

and the 50,000 —

Now, if in fact the 64,000 or any part of it
well, let me break it out here.

Let's assume that both of those are not included
for a minute.
A

Okay.

Q

Exclude both of them, which is essentially what

you've done on your chart, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

That would mean as of May 1981, you had been paid

$695,000.

Would you quarrel with that?
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Exhibit B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LAN C. ENGLAND,
Plaintiff,
TRIAL
vs.
Civil No. CIV 930901471 CV
EUGENE HORBACH, MEDICODE
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
on Tuesday, March 22, 1994

For the Plaintiff:

SAMUEL D. McVEY
RANDY AUSTIN
60 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
328-3600

For the Defendant
Horbach:

STEPHEN G. CROCKETT
WES FELIX
136 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah
533-8383

84101

STEVEN L. TAYLOR
311 South State, #450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
521-8900

ANNA

M. BENNETT, C.S.R.

License No. 220
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 535-5203
EXHIBIT "B"

A

Yes, I do.

Q

And actually, there are four checks beginning on

page 25 and continuing through page 28; is that correct?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Is it your understanding that those were the checks

that were paid to you to make up this $25,000 bounced check?
A

Yes.

Q

And the last payment is reflected on a check dated

2-17-92; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, on the back of that check which is on page 28

of Exhibit P-l, there appear to be some handwritten words,
"Final payment for stock purchase."
A

Yes.

Q

Did you write those in?

A

No, I did not.

Q

At some point did you request that Mr. Horbach

Mr. Horbach did.

deliver to you the two percent of the stock that's reflected
in the note, the handwritten note from the May meeting?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Do you recall when that was?

A

It's the December —

exhibits have been
Q

was it 1992?

I think the

—

Well, let me provide you with what's been marked as

Plaintiff's Exhibit P-6.

I'd ask you if you recognize
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Exhibit C

Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Randy T. Austin (A6171)
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAN C. ENGLAND,
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANT
EUGENE HORBACH

Plaintiff,
vs.

EUGENE HORBACH, an
individual, MEDICODE,
INCORPORATED, a Utah
corporation, and DOES I
through V,

Civil No. 930901471CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Plaintiff Lan C. England propounds the following discovery requests to
defendant Eugene Horbach. These discovery requests are to be answered pursuant to
Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Each request is continuing in
-1EXHIBIT "C"

INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify the complete basis for your
contention that you may have overpaid Lan England in connection with your purchase of
England's Medicode stock.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please identify the complete basis for the
Fourth Defense in your Answer to the Complaint that the "substitute agreement" should
be dismissed because it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify the complete basis for your
claim that the "substitute agreement" was not supported by consideration.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please identify any and all litigation with
which you were involved as of December 1, 1993, to the present, whether as a witness, a
party or otherwise. Specify the court in which the case was or is pending, the name of the
case, the case number, the judge presiding over the case, and the basic nature of the case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify all documents, including but
not limited to, minutes of corporate meetings, corporate records or memoranda, which
reflect or discuss in any way the transfer of Medicode stock from Lan England to you or
your agreement to hold stock in trust for Lan England.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify all persons involved in any
internal review of your records to determine what consideration had been paid Lan
England for shares of Medicode stock which you purchased.

-6-

